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arly?)	 “companion”	 should	 be	 an	 easy	 task	
for	a	professional	philosopher,	writing	on	The 
Blackwell Companion to Mill,	a	comprehen-
sive	collection	of	articles	on	John	Stuart	Mill,	
was  not  easy  at  all.  There  are  two  reasons  
for	that.	Firstly,	this	Companion is enormous 
–	 more	 than	 640	 pages	 in	 total.	 Secondly,	
editors	 of	 the	Companion  chose  a  very  un-
orthodox  approach  to  the  composition  and  
structure	of	 the	Companion.  Editors  tried  to  
picture	both	Mill’s	very	colorful	and	intensive	
life	and	his	multiple	and	comprehensive	 theo-
retical  activities.  The  result  is  a  remarkably  
exciting but colossal book that is not easy to 
read.
The Blackwell’s Companion is	 not	 the	 first	
“companion”	to	Mill.	In	1998,	The Cambridge 
Companion to Mill	had	been	published.	Then,	
in	2006,	The Blackwell Introduction to Mill’s 
Utilitarianism	 has	 appeared.	 Now,	 we	 have	
The Blackwell Companion to Mill.  It  seems  
natural to begin with the question that editors 
ask	 themselves	 at	 the	very	beginning	of	 the	
Companion.	Why	another	Companion?
“Why	 another	 book	 on	 Mill”,	 editors	 ask	
themselves.	This	 question	 is	 not	 just	 rhetor-
ical because the available literature on Mill’s 
life	and	philosophy	is	immense.	So,	they	re-
ally	should	offer	 their	answer.	Their	answer,	
in	short,	is	this:	a	new	Companion is needed 
because	Mill	has	been	the	subject	of	a	lot	of	
various	works	“lately”.	In	“just	one	decade”	
–	 from	2006	 to	2016	 (when	 the  Companion 
has	 been	 published),	 at	 least	 a	 dozen	 new	
monographs,	 a	 halfdozen	 edited	 collections	
of	original	papers,	and	a	new	biography	have	
appeared.	 Moreover,	 articles	 in	 academic	
journals	are	almost	uncountable.	
This	 answer	makes	 sense.	However,	 it	must	
not	be	forgotten	that	the	Blackwell Compan-
ion	is	not	the	first	companion	to	Mill’s	work.	
The Cambridge  Companion  to  Mill, edited 
by	 John	 Skorupski,	 was	 published	 in	 1998	
(Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 Cambridge).	
Evidently,	editors	of	the	Blackwell Compan-
ion	 think	 that	 (re?)interpretation	 of	 Mill’s	
work	 (and	 other	 achievements)	 is	 an	 ongo-






It  could  be  admitted  that  new developments  
in	 interpretations	 of	 Mill’s	 philosophy	 give	
a	 rationale	 for	preparing	a	unique	collection	
of	 those	“new	readings”.	The	question	is:	 to	
whom	 those	 “new	 readings”	 are	 addressed?	
It  is  not  entirely  clear  who  is  the  intended  
reader	 of	 the	Companion.  Its  heterogeneous  
structure	 with	 numerous	 (37)	 chapters	 sug-
gests	that	editors	had	some	kind	of	“catch-all”	
tactics.	If	the	Companion addresses the gener-
al	public,	then	some	significant	parts	of	it	are	
almost	incomprehensible	for	the	readers.	If	it	
is	a	 reading	 for	 scholars,	 then	 it	 is	not	clear	
what	is	the	purpose	of	the	ample	space	devot-
ed	to	non-philosophical	topics,	such	as	Mill’s	
biography,	Autobiography	 (as	 a	 literature?),	
political	 disputes,	 his	wife,	 and	 so	 on.	And,	
of	course,	why	are	some	minor	biographical	
details	 of	 any	 importance	 for	 the	 whole	 of	
Mill’s	thought?
However,	 that	 approach	 has	 a	 double	 edge	








Let	us	get	back	to	some	facts.	Due to the inev-
itable	heterogeneity	of	 topics	 and	approach-
es,	 every	 comprehensive	 “companion”	must	
have some troubles with its composition. The 
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Blackwell Companion to Mill	(C)	is	no	excep-
tion.	Let	us	mention	just	a	few.	Various	arti-
cles	are	partly	overlapping	and	 topic-mixed,	
without  apparent  reason.  Here  are  some  ex-
amples:	multiple	 references	 to	 the	 influence	
of	Harriet	Taylor	 on	Mill’s	 life	 and	 thought	
are	scattered	 in	chapters	1,	3,	4,	5,	7,	8	 (the	
whole	chapter),	9,	10,	11,	17,	19,	31,	and	33.	
Though inherently  connected  (Mill  does  not  
discern	them),	matters	of	logic,	epistemology,	
metaphysics,	 and	 the	 philosophy	 of	 science	
are	 treated	 separately,	 with	 unavoidable	 re-
dundancy	and	repetitiveness	(10,	12,	14,	15,	
and	 16).	 “Artistic”	 features	 of	 Mill’s	 work	
and	thought	are	also	situated	in	different	parts	
of	the	Companion.	Mill’s	famous	proof	of	the	
principle	 of	 utility	 is	mentioned	 in	 chapters	
20,	21,	22,	and	26.	And	so	on.
The Companion  editors  in  this  volume have 
included	 contributions	 of	 both	 well-known	
scholars  with  an  established  reputation  and  
several  new  interpreters.  Each  essay  should  
be  an  incentive  to  go  to  the  source  (Mill’s  
text).	 However,	 at	 the	 very	 beginning,	 it	 is	
quite  clear  that  the  Companion  is  not  made  
for	 beginners.	 The	 number	 (37)	 of	 articles	
(“chapters”)	 divided	 into	 six	 parts	 and	 the	
length	of	640	pages	are	certainly	beyond	the	
capacity	 of	 even	 a	 professional	 philosopher	
who	is	not	familiar	with	Mill’s	ideas.	So,	we	
can conclude that editors had on their minds a 
sort	of	“high-level”	Companion	for	those	who	
seek	 to	 understand	 a	 noticeably	 significant	
number	of	aspects	of	Mill’s	thought	in	its	va-
rieties.	Also,	it	is	obviously	meant	to	present	
the	 global	 direction	 of	 recent	 debates	 with-
in	 scholarship.	 However,	 the	 reader	 could	
acquire	 a	 powerful	 impression	 that	 editors	




and	 work,	 covering:	 his	 biography	 and	 the	
historical	 influences,	 his	 theoretical,	 mor-
al,	and	social	philosophy,	and	his	relation	to	
contemporary  movements.  It  is  not  straight-
forward	how	this	Companion should be read 
–	as	a	collection	of	articles	of	various	authors,	




moral philosophy. It  also provides insight in 
other	areas	of	his	lesser-known	work,	such	as	
his	 epistemology,	metaphysics,	 and	 philoso-
phy	of	language.	Surprisingly,	the	whole	two	
opening	parts	of	the	Companion  do not  deal 
much with Mill’s philosophy. 
Part	 I	 covers	 Mill’s	 life,	 his	 posthumous	
reputation,	 and	 his	 story	 of	 his	 life	 (Auto-
biography).	 It	 deals	 with	 biographical	 facts	
and  Mill’s  various  interests  and  activities.  
Of	course,	his	 life	has	always	been	a	source	
of	 notable	 interest.	 Presented	 biographical	




tionship with Harriet Taylor and political en-
gagement	in	the	Parliament,	etc.	All	those	as-
pects	of	Mill’s	life	are	fascinating.	However,	
behind  these  tales  lie  questions  about  Mill’s  
relationship to his intellectual and philosoph-
ical inheritance and whether Mill is a reliable 
interpreter	of	his	own	life.
Part  II  brings  together  a  comprehensive  
summary	of	the	various	influences	 on	Mill’s	









on	Mills’	 ideas,	 Jeremy	Bentham’s	 theoreti-
cal	influence	on	his	moral	philosophy	was	not	
separated  and  presented  systematically.  This  
approach looks rather unusual. Bentham was 
not	 only	Mill’s	mentor.	 Together	with	Mill,	
he	 is	 an	acknowledged	“founding	 father”	of	
utilitarianism.	 Also,	 it	 is	 not	 entirely	 clear	
why	 Mill’s	 youthful	 disappointment	 in	 his	
teacher is elaborated almost in detail and not 
the  circumstances  that  preceded  that  disap-
pointment.	Some	articles	at	the	beginning	of	
the Companion are	more	 likely	material	 for	




and	 problematic	 aspects	 of	 his	 relationship	
with	his	 teacher	Jeremy	Bentham	(cf.	Elijah	
Millgram,	 “Mill’s	 Incubus”,	 in:	 Ben	 Eggle-
ston,	Dale	Miller,	and	David	Weinstein	(eds.),	
John Stuart Mill and the Art of Life,	Oxford	
University	 Press,	 Oxford	 2011).	 Millgram’s	
elaborated	story	on	“two	epiphanies”	mounts	
to	only	one	true	revelation:	Bentham	was	not	
a	 genius.	 Millgram’s	 “Two	 epiphanies”	 (C:	
12–29)	 shows	not	 only	Mill’s	 ambiguity	 to-
wards  Bentham’s  intellectual  achievements  
but  also  a  disappointment  in  his  intellectual  
capacities.	“Young	Mill”,	the	story	goes,	had	
not	 been	 aware	 of	 Bentham’s	 limitations.	
But,	after	the	famous	“mental	crisis”,	he	had	
a	 revelation.	 Moreover,	 Bentham	 is	 almost	
accused	 of	 causing	 Mill’s	 famous	 “mental	
crises”:
“[Mill’s]	 teenage	 emotional	 commitment	 to	 the	
utilitarian political enterprise was threatened by the 















Part  III  (“Foundations	 of	 Mill’s	 Thought”)	
finally	 gets	 to	Mill’s	 philosophy.	 It	 aims	 to	
give	an	account	of	 the	foundations	of	Mill’s	
philosophy  and  his  thought  on  key  philo-
sophic topics.	Mill	follows	the	growth	of	the	
physical,	biological,	and	social	sciences	in	his	




challenging	 problems.	The	 question	 is:	 how	
should  we  reconcile  the  mind  as  a  natural  
object	in	the	world	and	the	mind	as	the	con-
dition	 for	 the	cognition	of	 that	 same	world?	




as	 aesthetics,	 history,	 and	 religion.	 These	
fields,	 although	sometimes	not	thought	of	as	
philosophical	or	theoretical,	are	closely	relat-
ed to those issues.
It is still an open question	if	Mill’s	theoretical	
philosophy	is	only	a	groundwork	of	his	moral	
philosophy. In the Companion,	some	authors	
express their surprise that it has received lit-
tle	 attention,	 especially	 when	 compared	 to	
that	 of	 Locke	 and	 Hume.	 Now	 we	 should	
mention	 that	 “revision”	 as	 an	 interpretative	
approach is present in the whole Companion,	
not only in parts that broadly deal with moral 
philosophy	 (we	 shall	 deal	with	 that	 kind	 of	
revisionism	in	a	separate	section).	For	exam-




debate	 is	 not	 the	 context	 of	Mill’s	 thought”	
(C:	227).	Of	course,	new	interpretations	and	
“revision”	are	legitimate	in	philosophy.	How-
ever,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 these	particular	
claims	 belong	 to	 Nicholas	 Capaldi,	 who	 is,	
as	the	writer	of	Mill’s	newest	biography,	the	
author with considerable authority. It is quite 
unusual	for	a	biographer	to	offer	a	“revision”.
Parts  IV  and  V  deal  with  Mill’s  moral  and  
social  philosophy  that  we  will  discuss  more  
in	the	following	paragraphs,	and	that	will	be	










of	the	Companion. Those two parts deal with 
Mill’s	 ethics	 and	 social	 philosophy,	 which	
are	usually	taken	as	the	most	influential	 part	
of	Mill’s	thought.	As	we	have	already	noted,	
editors	of	the	Companion take an unusual in-
terpretative  route.  For  a  philosophically  un-
educated	 reader,	 in	 the	Preface  they  put  the  
following	instruction:	




This  clear  announcement  needs  elucidation  
because we are now dealing with the idea (the 
Art of Life)	that	colors	the	whole	Companion. 
Let us put it simply. The editors and authors 




is  that  this  expression  is  not  explicitly  used  
in Utilitarianism,	which	 is	usually	supposed	




Stuart	Mill,	Collected  Works  of  John  Stuart  
Mill,	 John	 M.	 Robson	 (ed.),	 University	 of	
Toronto	Press	–	Routledge	and	Kegan	Paul,	
Toronto	 1963	 –	 1991,	 (CW)	 10.210).	 It	 ap-
pears in the third	edition	of	A System of Logic 
and	 has	 been	 elaborated	 in	 only	 a	 few	pag-
es.  In  Logic,	at	first	 glance,	 it	 looks	 like	 the	
Art of Life contains only morality.	However,	




Mill,	A System of Logic,	CW	8.949).	A	usual	
revisionist  claim  based  on  this  observation  
is  that  the  Art  of  Life  is  the  practical  reason  
itself.	 The	 whole	 practical	 reason	 is	 based	
on	 the	 “utility”	 that	 governs	 three	 different	
“departments”.	 In	 that	 picture,	 moral	 has	 a	
characteristic	of	“enforceability”,	unlike	two	
other	 “departments”.	 However,	 “utility”	 en-
compasses all three departments and is not a 
distinctive	feature	of	morality.
Here	is	a	proper	place	to	emphasise	that,	de-
spite	 the	 global	 tendency	 to	 “revise”	Mill’s	
moral	 philosophy,	 still	 no	 one	 claims	 that	
he	was	not	a	“utilitarian”.	Main	revisionists’	




rality	but	the	principle	of	the	whole	Art of Life. 
That means that utility as a criterion cannot be 
directly	applied	to	the	morality	of	an	action.	














ing	 of	 the	 term	 “utilitarianism”	 that	 suffers	
the change. Let us see how.
It	 is	 safe	 to	 say	 that	 the	Companion’s  pres-
entation	of	Mill’s	moral	philosophy	is	based	
on a  revisionistic  approach  conceived  by  D.  
G. Brown. This claim should not be surpris-
ing at all  because the Companion  is devoted 
to	him	–	he	has	sadly	passed	away	just	before	
the	 publishing	 of	 the	 volume.	Moreover,	D.	




being	a	sole	voice	 in	a	 (utilitarian)	desert	 to	
become	 (shall	 we	 say)	 a	 “new	 orthodoxy”.	
But,	what	does	“revisionism”	mean?	In	short,	
“Millian	 revisionism”	 (our	 term)	 is	 best	 de-
scribed	 by	 the	 following	 D.	 G.	 Brown’s	
words:
“To	 those	 who	 continue	 to	 see	 Mill	 as	 firmly	 at	
home	in	a	continuous	utilitarian	tradition,	the	most	




consequentialism.	 This,	 however,	 seems	 to	 me	 to	
be	the	heart	of	revisionism	and	to	be	fundamentally	
sound,	even	while	plenty	of	difficulties	remain.”	(D.	
G.	 Brown,	 “Mill’s	Moral	 Theory:	 Ongoing	 Revi-
sionism”,	Politics, Policy and Economics	9	(2010)	
1,	pp.	5–45,	p.	6.)
The	 critical	 thesis	 of	 Millian	 revisionism	
is	 that	 it	 is	questionable	if	Mill	has	ever	en-
dorsed	the	so-called	“maximizing	utilitarian-
ism”	of	any	kind.	This	claim,	the	story	goes	
on,	 is	 opposed	 to	 “standard”	 or	 “classical	
interpretation”.	But	what	is	“the	standard	in-
terpretation”? That  question  has  never  been  
answered explicitly in revisionists’ literature. 
However,	here	is	one	interpretation	that	prob-
ably	 covers	 the	main	 features	 of	 a	 standard	
view	on	utilitarianism:
“In	 its	 standard	 form	 it	 [utilitarianism]	can	be	ex-
pressed	 as	 the	 combination	 of	 two	 principles:	 (1)	
the consequentialist principle that	the	rightness,	or	
wrongness,	of	an	action	is	determined	by	the	good-
ness,	or	badness,	of	the	results	that	flow	from	it	and	







principle:	 the rightness  of  an action is  determined 
by its contribution to the happiness of everyone af-
fected  by  it.”	 (Antony	Quinton,	Utilitarian Ethics,	
Macmillan,	London	and	Basingstoke	1973,	p.	1.)
This	simple	characterization	of	utilitarianism	







“contribution”	 to	 the	 “intrinsic	 good”,	 then	





is	 not	 only	 possible	 moral	 “decision	 proce-
dure”.
Moreover,	revisionists	think	that	the	so-called	
“criteria	 of	 good”	 (“rightness”,	 sometimes)	
could	be,	and	even	should	be,	sharply	distin-
guished	 from	 (moral)	 “decision	 procedure”.	







of	 the	 rightness	and	wrongness	of	actions,	 it	does	
















Crisp,	 for	 example)	 of	 Mill’s	 utilitarianism	
do	 not	 understand	 what	 “utility”	 in	 Mill’s	
Utilitarianism	means.	Why	“the	principle	of	
utility”	is	“far	from	being	a	moral	principle”,	
as	D.	G.	Brown	 suggests?	Only	 because	 all	





must	 explain	what	 “utilitarianism”	means	 if	
somehow forbids	“maximization”.
However,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 very	 expression	









utilitarians	 are	 aware	 that	 the	 estimation	 of	
utility	 should	 include	all	 relevant	and	“indi-
rect”	 factors	 in	 the	 form	 of	 approximation.	
That	does	not	mean	that	the	goal	–	“maximal	
utility”	 (=happiness)	 –	 should	 be	 forgotten.	
Besides,	in	some	situations,	the	direct	calcu-
lation could be	the	self-evident	method.	Why,	
in	 such	 an	 occasion,	we	 have	 an	 obligation	
not	to	pursue	(maximal)	utility	directly?
It  is  well  known  that  utilitarianism received  
many	criticisms	because	the	method	of	maxi-
misation	by	direct	calculation	of	consequenc-
es	 of	 a	 specific	 action	 is	 complicated	 and	
practically  impossible  to  accomplish.  These  
criticisms	open	the	door	for	“indirect	utilitar-
ianism”.	The	main	form	of	“indirect	utilitar-








How are these ideas connected with an inter-
pretation	of	Mill’s	word?	The	very	possibility	
that	utilitarianism	allows	different	or	multiple	
decision procedures does not imply that Mill 
ever	 thought	 about	 technical	 “procedures”.	
Discussion	on	any	“procedure”	is	not	explic-
it  in  Utilitarianism,	 and	 anybody	 can	 read	
into	 it	whatever	 they	wish.	Of	course,	 some	
passages  suggest  an  indirect  approach.  On  
the	other	hand,	some	famous	quotes	directly	
connect	right	and	utility.	So,	why	do	revision-




tion.	However,	 it	 seems	 that	 revisionists	 are	





Even	 nowadays,	 it	 seems	 that	Bentham	 and	
Mill	assume	that	the	presence	of	the	“intrinsic	
good”	(utility,	pleasure,	happiness	–	all	those	
are	 interconnected)	 is	 the	feature	 that	makes 
an  action  right  or  wrong.  The  problem with  
the	“right”	 for	 revisionists’	approach	 is	now	
straightforward.	 Even	 though	 we	 can	 think	
of	“degrees	of	good”,	it	seems	(semantically,	
not	only	morally)	odd	or	almost	unintelligible	
to	 talk	 about	 “degree	 of	 rightness”.	 For,	we	
usually	think	of	some	action	as	either	“right”	
or	“wrong”	but	seldom	as	“right	to	some	ex-
tent”.	 Now,	 if	 the	 utilitarian	 “right”	 implies 
“the	 maximum	 of	 good”,	 then	 “maximiza-
tion”	is	an	inevitable	consequence	of	the	util-
itarian	theory,	not	an	arbitrary	interpretation.	
The standard interpretation would imply that 
“non-maximizing”	utilitarianism	is	not	a	utili-
tarianism at all. 
How does a revisionist explain why Mill is a 
non-maximizing	utilitarian?	 In	 the	Compan-
ion,	D.	G.	Brown	writes:
“He	 [Mill]	 has	 no	 such	 [utility]	maximizing	 prin-
ciple	 of	moral	 requirement.	This	 position	 remains	









ment.	What	 is	morally	 basic	 proves	 to	 depend	on	
how he perceives the pro tanto general utilities (in 
the	 largest	 sense)	 of	 various	 kinds	 of	 social	 com-
pulsion.	 One	 bit	 of	 jargon	 has	 obscured	 the	 rele-
vance	here	of	commendable	attention	to	just	which	
utilities	Mill	 assesses,	 of	 acts,	 rules,	 or	whatever,	
namely:	 the	 variously	 defined,	 or	 undefined,	 term	




something	 required,	 namely	 that	 it	 in	 some	 sense	





flows	from	formulating	ultimate	ends. Mill’s actual 
practice	 is	 the	 route	 to	 finding	 the	 classes	 of	 fac-
tual  consideration he takes to be morally relevant.  
He	starts	from	real	states	of	affairs,	or	realistically	
conceivable	ones,	and	considers	what	reasons	they	
provide	 for	 individual	 or	 collective	 decision.	 The	
content	 of	 the	decision	 is	 constrained	by	 the	 situ-
ation,	the	information	available,	the	abilities	of	the	





is  the  very  thing  Mill  calls  promoting  the  general  
welfare. The	 policy,	 when	 faced	 with	 options,	 of	
preferring	 a	 greater	 utility	 to	 a	 lesser,	makes	Mill	
in	one	sense	an	optimizer.	So	are	we	all.”	(C:	418.)
It  is  a  manner  in  recent  literature  to  present  
this  revisionist  view  as  new  and  unmarked.  





“Despite	 the	comparatively	 little	attention	 that	 the	
Art  of  Life  has  received in  the  extensive  scholarly  
literature	on	Mill,	 it	 turns	out	 to	be	extremely	im-
portant to understanding his moral philosophy and 
his  practical  philosophy more  generally.  It  reveals  
Mill  to  be  a  much  subtler  philosopher  than  some  
presentations	 of	 his	 views	 would	 suggest.	 It	 also	
insulates	him	from	many	unwarranted	criticisms.”	
(C:	297.)
It is hard to understand these repetitive com-
plaints that go against the available evidence. 
The Art  of  Life	occupies	 large,	not	“a	 little”	
attention  in  recent  ethical  literature  on  Mill.  
There is a whole collection on the Art of Life 
published	 in	 2011	 (Ben	 Eggleston,	 Dale	 E.	
Miller,	 David	Weinstein	 (eds.),	 John  Stuart  
Mill  and  the  Art  of  Life,	 Oxford	 Universi-
ty	 Press,	 Oxford	 2011).	 Historically,	 D.	 G.	




Canadian Journal of Philosophy	3	(1973)	1,	
pp.	 1–12).	The	 term	 “revisionism”	was	 first	
explicitly	mentioned	in	1979	(John	N.	Gray,	
“John	Stuart	Mill:	Traditional	and	Revision-
ist	 Interpretation”,	 Literature  of  Liberty	 2	
(1979)	2.	David	Lyons	published	a	whole	col-
lection	of	 essays	on	Mill’s	Utilitarianism  in  
1997,	which	includes	D.	G.	Brown’s	already	
published	works	 (David	 Lyons,	 (ed.),	Mill’s 
Utilitarianism: Critical Essays,	Rowman	and	
Littlefield,	 Oxford	 1997).	 In	 the	 relatively	
recent Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitar-
ianism,  the  Art  of  Life  has  undoubtedly  not  
been	 forgotten.	Guy	Fletcher	 himself	 is	 one	
of	 the	 contributors	 (cf.	 Guy	 Fletcher,	 “Act	
utilitarianism”,	 in:	 James	 E.	 Crimmins,	The 
Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism,	
Bloomsbury,	London	–	New	York	2013,	pp.	
1–5).	We	could	go	further,	but	this	list	should	
be illustrative enough. It is evident that revi-
sionism based on the Art of Life	has	not	got	“a	
little	attention”.	The	 real	question	 is:	 “What	
more	 should	 be	 done	 to	 satisfy	 revisionists’	
appetites?”
As	we	have	already	pointed	out,	revisionists	
usually	 suggest	 a	 careful	 reader	 could,	 in	
Mill’s	 own	 words,	 find	 clues	 for	 “right”	 or	
“revisionistic”	 interpretation.	 However,	 be-







one	 of	 my	 secondary	 premises	 in	 common	 with	
them;	nor	a	utilitarian	at	all,	unless	in	quite	another	
sense	from	what	perhaps	any	one	except	myself	un-
derstands by the word. It would take a whole letter 
to	make	 it	quite	clear	 to	you	what	 I	mean.”	 (John	
Stuart	Mill,	“Letter	to	Carlyle”,	CW	2.207.)
It  is  evident  that  Mill  here  tries  to  distance  
himself	 from	 some	 “utilitarians”.	 However,	
it	 is	 not	 clear	who	 they	 are.	 Is	 it	Bentham?	
It  does  not  seem  so.  Even  in  his  expressed  
doubts	about	Bentham’s	work,	Mill	has	nev-
er  openly  questioned  the  central  idea  that  
“good”	 (pleasure)	 is	 additive	 (that	 can	 be	
maximized).
Next	revisionists’	“evidence”	consists	of	nine	
pages  on  the  Art  of  Life	 from	 the	 third	 edi-
tion	of	Mill’s	A System of Logic.	Essentially,	
revisionists  claim that  those  nine  pages  (out  
of	1251	pages	of	 the	final	 version	of	Logic,	
which	is	just	one	of	33	volumes	of	Mill’s	Col-





tarianism	 –	 is	 a	 genuine	overview	of	Mill’s	
ethical theory or a mere popular presentation 
of	the	prevalent	opinion	in	Mill’s	intellectual	
circle.  The point  is  that  without  revisionists’ 
guidance,	Utilitarianism could be misleading:
“Mill’s	essay	[Utilitarianism]	can	be	read	by	itself	
for	the	theories	it	expresses	or	suggests.	To	achieve	
a	 fuller	 understanding	 of	 Mill’s	 moral	 ideas,	 it	
should	be	read	with	some	of	his	other	works,	such	
as	 the	 essays	 on	Bentham,	On	Liberty,	 and	Book	
VI	of	A System of  Logic,	“On	 the	Logic	of	Moral	








to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those 
only	 are	 happy	 (I	 thought)	who	 have	 their	minds	
fixed	 on	 some	 object	 other	 than	 their	 own	 happi-




they	 find	 happiness	 by	 the	 way.	 The	 enjoyments	
of	 life	(such	was	now	my	theory)	are	sufficient	 to	




dence	 in	 favor	of	 a	 strong	 thesis	 that	whole	
Mill’s	 moral	 philosophy	 should	 (or	 could)	
be	 interpreted	 in	 the	 light	of	 the	Art  of  Life. 
Some	 other	 facts	 also	 go	 against	 revisionist	
interpretations.	Firstly,	the	expression	the	Art 
of  Life	does	not	even	appear	 in	 the	first	 and	
second	edition	of	A System of Logic.	The	first	
edition	of	Logic	was	published	in	1843,	third	
edition	–	 in	1851,	eight  years  later.  Second-





itarianism, Mill does  not	 even	mention	“the	
art	of	 life”.	In	Utilitarianism,	 the	reader	can	




ory  or  how  much  it  is  probable  that  he  has  
forgotten	what	the	“keywords”	are.	It	is	hard	
to understand why Mill would be so shy about 
supposedly	basic	terms	of	his	own	moral	the-
ory.	Why	the	Art of Life was not (in Utilitari-
anism)	explicitly	and	clearly	established	as	a	
foundation	of	moral,	political,	and	social	phi-
losophy?	Why	were	 the	most	 valuable	 nine	
pages	 stayed	hidden	 in	 a	 dark	 corner	 of	 the	
third	edition	of	his	forgotten	work	(A System 
of  Logic)?	 Those	 are	 unanswered	 questions	
for	the	revisionist.
Finally,	 in	 the	 Companion,	 the	 manner	 of	
presentation	 of	 discussion	 on	 Mill’s	 moral	
philosophy	 is	 strange.	For	 example,	 there	 is	
no separate article on a still present and huge 
act/rule	utilitarianism	dispute	 that	has	domi-
nated	the	ethical	literature	from	the	middle	of	
the	20th	 century	 to	 the	 eighties	 (that	 debate	
has started with a question whether Mill was 
act-	or	rule-utilitarian).	Maybe	even	stranger	




evidence  (Mill’s  Collected  Works),	 nobody,	
not	 even	 revisionists,	 could	 ever	 claim	 that	
the Art of Life is more central than the utility 
principle in Mill’s ethical theory. That is sim-
ply not true.
Even some contemporary authors sympathet-
ic  to  the  revisionist’s  approach  are  reluctant  
to accept the rigid idea that Art of Life is the 
key	to	the	interpretation	of	Mill’s	moral	phi-
losophy.	One	of	them	reminds	us	that	Mill’s	
“canonical	 passages”	 from	 Utilitarianism 
cannot  be  easily  circumvented.  Those  pas-
sages	point	 to	 the	 so-called	“Proportionality	
Doctrine”,	 which	 is	 directly	 opposed	 to	 the	
revisionist’s  non-maximizing view on Mill’s  
utilitarianism.  Let  us  remind  ourselves  how  
those passages look.
Firstly,	Mill	 clearly	 says	 that	utilitarians	 are	





als,	 Utility,	 or	 the	 Greatest	 Happiness	 Principle,	
holds  that  actions  are  right  in  proportion  as  they  








on justice	 and	 begins	with	 the	 same	words:	
utilitarianism  is  the  doctrine  that  Utility  or  
Happiness is the criterion of right and wrong 
(J.	S.	Mill,	Utilitarianism,	CW	10.240).
These	quotes	naturally	raise	a	question:	“Why	
do D. G. Brown and other revisionists claim 
that  utility  is  not	 a	criterion	of	 rightness	ac-
tions?”	 For	 that	 question,	 there	 are	 almost	
none	of	the	direct	answers.	As	we	have	seen,	
the	 central	 thesis	 of	 revisionists’	 interpreta-
tions	of	Mill’s	utilitarianism	 is	 that	his	 con-




The  revisionist  reasoning  here  is  somewhat  
odd:	the	happiness	is	the	sole	Good	(those	are	
Mill’s	words),	but	we	should	not try to max-
imise	 it	 directly.	Of	 course,	Mill	 does	 think	
that	 sometimes	 we	 can,	 by	 directly	 seeking	
maximal	 happiness,	 cause	much	more	 dam-
age	than	“good”	consequences.	However,	this	
remark does not mean that the technical term 
“utility”	 is	 not	 semantically	 connected	 with	
the	maximizing	of	 the	good.	Mill’s	“canoni-
cal	passages”	suggest	that	the	“maximizing”	





scholarly	 valuable.	 Since	 1870	 to	 the	 pres-
ent-day,	Mill	 has	 regularly	 been	 accused	 of	
the	“fallacy	of	equivocation”	and	other	errors	
in	the	“proof”	(cf.	John	Grote,	An Examina-
tion  of  the  Utilitarian  Philosophy,	Deighton	
Bell,	Cambridge	1870).	The	accusation	is	that	
Mill	 confuses	 the	 actually  desired  (descrip-
tive	 phrase)	with	 the	 ideally	desirable  (nor-
mative	expression).	Another	common	charge	
is	 the	 “fallacy	 of	 composition”.	 Also,	 Mill	
supposedly	 uses	 the	word	 “all”	 distributive-
ly  in  one  place  and  collectively  in  another.  
Finally,	 the	 most	 famous	 accusation	 comes	
from	G.	E.	Moore.	In	Principia Ethica,	he	ac-
cuses	Mill	of	the	naturalistic fallacy (George 
Edward	Moore,	Principia Ethica,	Cambridge	
University	Press,	Cambridge	1903,	§12;	§43–
45).	 Such	 criticisms	 have	 led	 to	 a	 standard	
view	 that	 the	 proof	 offered	 in	 Chapter	 4	 of	
Utilitarianism is wrong.
In  the  Companion,	 Henry	West,	 not	 for	 the	








neapolis	 1982).	West	 argues	 that	 the	 aim	of	
Mill’s	proof	aims	only	for	the	conclusion	that	
happiness	 is	 desirable	 and,	 indeed,	 the	 only	
desirable  end.  His  analysis  is  also  based  on  
Mill’s System of Logic,	but	has	nothing	to	do	
with	the	rather	vague	idea	of	the	Art of Life. 
Instead,	 West	 uses	 the	 distinction	 between	
factual	 and	 normative	 propositions,	 which	
in Mill’s Logic is explicit. He concludes that 






between	 ‘visible’	 and	 ‘desirable’	 is	 announced	 in	
the	first	paragraph	of	the	chapter:	The	first	premises	
of	our	knowledge	do	not	admit	of	proof	by	reaso-
ning,	but	are	subject	 to	a	direct	appeal	 to	 the	sen-





the	 senses,	 so	 judgments	 of	 what	 is	 desirable	 are	
based	on	what	 is	desired	and	corrected	by	 further	
evidence	of	what	is	desired.”	(“The	Proof”,	C:	333.)
The Companion  is  a  valuable  resource  and  
contribution to scholars interested in the phi-
losophy	of	John	Stuart	Mill.	The	editors	have	
gathered	 some	 of	 the	 most	 notable	 authori-
ties  on Mill  and have created a  great  source 
of	 information	on	 the	most	crucial	 issues	of	
Mill’s	philosophy.	However,	the	scope	of	this	
companion	 goes	 even	 further.	 It	 examines	
sometimes	 neglected	 aspects	 of	 Mill’s	 life,	
significant	events,	and	certain	people	that	had	
contributed	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 his	 thought.	
Although	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 differentiate	 be-
tween  the  author’s  biographical  details  and  
his	 theoretical	 framework,	 it	 is	 enthralling	
for	the	reader	to	get	familiar	with	a	somewhat	
intimate	 aspect	 of	 one’s	 life.	Having	 this	 in	
mind,	 some	parts	of	 this	Companion  can  be  
used	as	an	exciting	read	for	non-philosophers.	
Regarding	 other	 parts,	 the	 Companion  is  a  
demanding	read	–	both	for	its	volume	and	its	
approach.	 Despite	 that	 fact,	 it	 is	 a	 valuable	
contribution	 and	 extension	 of	 various	 inter-
pretations	of	Mill’s	thought,	not	only	around	





piecemeal  approach.  It  is  almost  impossible  
to  comprise  the  whole  Companion  at  once.  
For	 professionals,	 selective	 reading	 should	
be	helpful.	For	example,	 there	 is	no	need	 to	
burden	an	absorption	of	Mill’s	theoretical	or	





















The Ineffable Nature of the Divine  which  
deals  with  via  negativa,	 or	 negative  theol-
ogy,	 gives	 an	 important	 philosophical	 and	
historical	account	on	the	genesis	of	the	apo-
phatic  idea  that  God’s  nature  cannot  in  any  
way	be	known,	or	 communicated	 to	beings.	
The	 peculiar	 nature	 of	 negative	 theology	 is	
most	obvious	in	the	fact	that	those	who	have	
dealt	with	this	particular	way	of	thinking	have	
coined  many  complicated  and  multi-layered  
metaphysical systems in order to express the 
ineffable	 nature	 of	 the	Divine,	 or	God’s	 es-
sence.  This  in  its  own  right  makes  the  sub-
ject	of	via negativa all the more obscure and 









logical position in the philosophical systems 
of	many	authors	who	wrote	on	this	subject.
Furthermore,	it	is	claimed	that	God’s	essence	
is	 unknowable,	 but	 if	 that	 is	 the	 case,	 then	
